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Abstract
Background: In several countries, health care policies gear toward strengthening the position of primary care
physicians. Primary care physicians are increasingly expected to take accountability for overall spending and quality.
Yet traditional models of paying physicians do not provide adequate incentives for taking on this new role. Under a
so-called shared savings program physicians are instead incentivized to take accountability for spending and
quality, as the program lets them share in cost savings when quality targets are met. We provide a structured
approach to designing a shared savings program for primary care, and apply this approach to the design of a
shared savings program for a Dutch chain of primary care providers, which is currently being piloted.
Methods: Based on the literature, we defined five building blocks of shared savings models that encompass the
definition of the scope of the program, the calculation of health care expenditures, the construction of a savings
benchmark, the assessment of savings and the rules and conditions under which savings are shared. We apply
insights from a variety of literatures to assess the relative merits of alternative design choices within these building
blocks. The shared savings program uses an econometric model of provider expenditures as an input to calculating
a casemix-corrected benchmark.
Results: The minimization of risk and uncertainty for both payer and provider is pertinent to the design of a shared
savings program. In that respect, the primary care setting provides a number of unique opportunities for achieving
cost and quality targets. Accountability can more readily be assumed due to the relatively long-lasting relationships
between primary care physicians and patients. A stable population furthermore improves the confidence with
which savings can be attributed to changes in population management. Challenges arise from the institutional
context. The Dutch health care system has a fragmented structure and providers are typically small in size.
Conclusion: Shared savings programs fit the concept of enhanced primary care. Incorporating a shared savings
program into existing payment models could therefore contribute to the financial sustainability of this
organizational form.
Keywords: Payment reform, Accountable care, Shared savings, Primary care
Background
Having a strong primary care setting contributes to the
functioning of the health care system [1]. Therefore,
strengthening the primary care setting is a widely ob-
served policy response to conditions that threaten the
sustainability of a health care system. For example,
several countries have introduced a gatekeeping system
in order to manage the increased demand for specialist
services [2], letting primary care physicians control ac-
cess to secondary care providers.
To date, even countries that are considered to have a
relatively strong primary care setting (like the UK and
the Netherlands) [1], are looking for ways to address the
needs of an ageing and frail population, in which the
number of patients with comorbid conditions rises [3,
4]. Government policies have geared towards fostering a
whole-patient approach to primary care, meaning that
patients are assigned a personal primary care physician
* Correspondence: a.p.hayen@tilburguniversity.edu
1Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, dpt. Tranzo (Scientific
center for care and welfare), Tilburg University, Address: PO Box 901535000
Tilburg, LE, The Netherlands
2National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Centre for
Nutrition, Prevention and Health Services, Address: PO Box, 3720, Bilthoven,
BA, The Netherlands
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Hayen et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Hayen et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:580 
DOI 10.1186/s12913-015-1250-0
who coordinates care across the continuum and substi-
tutes for specialist care when appropriate [5–7].
However, current modes of paying primary care physi-
cians (capitation, fee-for-service, salary) [8] may not be
aligned well enough with these policy goals. These pay-
ment models neither provide the additional resources
necessary for maintaining a whole-patient perspective,
nor do they incentivize primary care physicians to act
upon their role of managing costs and quality across the
continuum of care [9]. They may even run counter to
these goals [9, 10]. Although financial micro-incentives
(like pay-for-performance) may be used to attain better
costs and quality results, a recent survey by the Nuffield
Trust suggested that these incentives tend not to stimu-
late change across the entire continuum of services but
rather in narrow clinical areas [11]. Health care profes-
sionals proposed to develop risk-sharing arrangements
that cover a wide(r) range of services, instead. Also from
a theoretical perspective, introducing some form of risk-
sharing in which the insurer shares the risk of achieving
high costs or suboptimal value with providers, may help
to align interests in a setting where interests tend to di-
verge [12].
Currently a variety of these arrangements are devel-
oped and piloted, including shared savings, bundled pay-
ment and global payment models [13, 14]. With over
400 participating provider groups and 8 million covered
beneficiaries [15], the US Medicare Shared Savings Pro-
gram receives wide scrutiny. Under a shared savings pro-
gram payers hold providers accountable for the overall
costs and quality of care for a predefined population of
patients [16]. Accountability goes beyond reporting
about performance to actually share in savings in overall
health care expenditures, once quality targets have been
met. Providers can reinvest these savings in support of a
whole-patient perspective. Furthermore, the prospect of
receiving savings in overall expenditures incentivizes to
actually deliver the enhanced primary care as envisioned
by policy makers. Landon et al. argue that the financial
incentives that follow from a shared savings program are
best suited to the needs of a strengthened primary care
setting, and urge to incorporate shared savings programs
directly into enhanced primary care initiatives [9, 17].
In the Netherlands, a pilot with a shared savings pro-
gram for primary care was introduced for a group of pri-
mary care providers (in an additional file we provide a
brief description of Dutch primary care, see Additional
file 1; primary care providers are hereafter referred to as
“(pilot) providers”). This shared saving program included
a one-sided payment model, which means that providers
only share in savings and not in losses. The program
was incorporated in the existing payment model, which
is a mix of quarterly capitation fees and fee-for-service.
The primary aim of this pilot is to lower spending
growth without compromising on the quality of care.
The approach is to reorient providers towards value-
based care, or to otherwise provide financial support for
such an orientation, by introducing the prospect of shar-
ing in expenditure savings, conditional on achieving
quality targets.
We describe a structured approach to designing
shared savings programs for primary care, discuss pros
and cons of alternative design choices, report on our ex-
perience in weighing alternative design choices in reach-
ing a final decision, and discuss opportunities and
challenges of operating a shared savings program within
a managed competition.
Shared savings programs
We distilled the designs of earlier shared savings models
[18–23] into five overarching building blocks of shared
savings models, which we use here to ease exposition
(Fig. 1): the definition of the scope of the program, the
calculation of provider expenditures, construction of the
benchmark against which expenditures are assessed, as-
sessment of savings and the rules and conditions for
sharing savings. We first provide a background to the
building blocks in which we briefly outline the choices
to be made. In the remaining sections we describe the
pilot program, its shared savings program (in terms of
the building blocks) and how it was implemented.
Risk-sharing under a shared savings program
Under a shared savings program, insurers share part of
the risk of increasing expenditures with care providers.
For instance, care providers who start investing in their
infrastructure in order to generate savings, lose income
when the shared savings payments are not enough to
cover expenses. Assuming risk-aversiveness on the side
of the primary care physicians, uncertainty surrounding
the outcome (expenditure savings as determined by the
model) is an important driver of behavior. In theory, un-
certainty drives investment behavior (choosing low-risk,
but low-return investments over high-risk high-return
investments) [24], but will also drive up the level of
compensation in exchange for which the provider is will-
ing to take on this risk [12]. From this, it follows that
risk and uncertainty are important drivers of the pro-
gram’s efficiency, and that they should be taken into ac-
count in the program design.
Building block 1: Definition of the scope
A first step in designing a shared savings program is to
decide on which patients and which health care services
to include. These two together define the scope of the
shared savings program. Providers only assume account-
ability for the patients and services under the scope of
the program, and only savings made within the scope of
Hayen et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:580 Page 2 of 15
the shared savings program count towards shared sav-
ings payments.
Patient population
A common way of defining the patient population is by
assigning patients to providers based on some measure
of health care usage. The general idea is that providers
are held accountable for the overall costs and quality re-
sults of patients that have received care from them. One
can choose between either prospective (based on a pa-
tient’s use of services in the prior year) or retrospective
assignment of patients (based on a patient’s use of ser-
vices in the performance year) [25], and adopt a majority
or plurality rule for assigning patients to providers. For
example, in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, pa-
tients are assigned retrospectively to providers based on
where they have received the plurality of primary care
services in that year.
Services included
In general, shared savings programs are targeted at a full
set of services, which differs between programs depend-
ing on the payer involved and the line of business cov-
ered [18]. For example, the Medicare Demonstration
Programs and its recent (Medicare) Shared Savings Pro-
gram include the full set of services furnished under
Medicare Parts A and B. The Alternative Quality Con-
tract, launched by Blue Cross Blue Shield Massachusetts,
includes all medical services Blue Cross pays for18.
Rather than excluding expensive services, one can
limit the effects cost outliers have on provider ex-
penditure averages (building block 2) by defining an
expenditure threshold. In case a patient’s costs exceed
this threshold, the part above the threshold does not
count towards provider expenditures. In the Physician
Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration Program, expen-
ditures were capped at $100,000. In later versions of
the program, expenditures were capped at the 99th
percentile of expenditures. For specific subgroups,
such as for patients with end-stage renal disease, dif-
ferent expenditure caps were defined such that it cre-
ated a similar “exposure above group mean
expenditures” [19].
Building block 2: Calculation of provider expenditures
Annualizing expenditures, weighing patients observations
and the expenditure cap
Provider expenditures are defined as the sum of
claims payments made within the scope of the pro-
gram, including co-payments. Provider expenditures
are commonly expressed as average expenditures per
year of insurance, which is obtained by annualizing
patients’ health care expenditures and calculating a
weighted average using patients’ length of enrollment
as weights [19, 26]. The cap on expenditures (build-
ing block 1) is implemented by truncating annualized
expenditures.
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Fig. 1 The five building blocks of the shared savings program and their elements. The five building blocks are numbered consecutively from 1 to
5. The blocks in the column on the right depict, for each building block, its elements
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Building block 3: Construction of the benchmark
Benchmark population and trending factor
In order to determine whether a provider has realized
expenditure savings at the end of the performance year,
its expenditures are evaluated against a benchmark.
There are several approaches to designing a benchmark.
One approach is to design the benchmark such that it
can be interpreted as the counterfactual of what health
care expenditures would have been had the shared sav-
ings program not been implemented. Savings are then
defined with respect to historical performance, which is
trended forward to the performance year by extrapolat-
ing the provider’s growth trend. Such an approach was
used in the early years of the Alternative Quality Con-
tract, where this number served as an input for Blue
Cross in negotiating budgets with participating Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)18. Another ap-
proach is to design the benchmark such that additional
incentives for inefficient providers follow from it. An ex-
treme example of such an approach would be to make
the entire benchmark context-independent, by setting it
equal to a national or regional expenditure average. In
this case, some providers will only outperform the
benchmark when they address built-in inefficiency first.
Commonly, programs adopt a blended approach. They
do use a provider’s historical cost average, but then trend
this number forward by a regional (PGP Demonstration)
or national (Medicare Shared Savings Program, PGP
Transition Demonstration) growth trend [18].
Risk adjustment
Shared savings programs commonly adjust the bench-
mark’s base and trending factor for changes in casemix
[20, 23, 27]. For those programs adopting a blended ap-
proach to designing the benchmark, the historical ex-
penditures that make up the benchmark’s base may
reflect a patient population with a case mix different
from the provider’s current population. Similarly, the pa-
tients assigned to control providers–whose changes in
expenditures make up the benchmark’s growth trend–
may differ in terms of case mix from those assigned to a
participating provider.
Absent a correction for casemix, the composition of a
population may play a too large role in determining sav-
ings (as determined by the model). The case mix correc-
tion needs a careful design, however. First of all, direct
standardization of the provider and benchmark popula-
tion is not suitable for determining a provider’s expend-
iture savings. Direct standardization gives a provider X’s
expenditures had he served the average population, and
will therefore not give an indication of realized savings.
Rather one wants to calculate the expenditures of an
average provider, had he served provider X’s population.
Savings are then calculated by subtracting this number
from provider X’s realized expenditures. Second, one
must decide on the variables to adjust for. An intuitive
approach is to add all variables that meaningfully explain
variation in individual health care expenditures. This im-
proves the prediction of the counterfactual. The problem
with this approach is that some of these variables’ values
can be influenced by care providers, e.g. health status.
Rather than removing these variables from the risk ad-
justment model a third choice is to decide on the timing
of risk adjustment. This could be either prospective
(using information as known prior to the start of the
performance year) or concurrent (using performance
year information) [28].
Building block 4: Assessment of savings
Approach to constructing the savings threshold
Provider expenditures are evaluated against the bench-
mark. Random variation in the incidence or progression
of illnesses causes random fluctuations in health care ex-
penditures. Accordingly, providers may outperform the
benchmark by chance alone but also run the risk that
true cost-saving efforts go unrewarded [29]. A general
insight from microeconomics is that this kind of ran-
domness lowers the strength of the incentive [30]. Public
programs commonly hedge against paying ‘undeserved’
savings [18], by requiring that the difference between
benchmark and provider expenditures passes a mini-
mum threshold level. In the PGP Demonstration and the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, statistical techniques
are applied to determine the confidence intervals on
which the savings thresholds are based.
Building block 5: Rules and conditions for sharing savings
Sharing rate and shared savings payment limit
A final set of decisions concerns the sharing of savings
between payer and provider. Contracts typically include
a sharing rate [18], e.g. that savings will be split evenly
between the payer and provider. Public programs like
the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the PGP
Demonstration added a shared savings payment limit,
expressed as a percentage of benchmark spending. Like
the savings threshold, the presence of either a sharing
rate or performance payment limit serves as a hedge
against making undeserved shared savings payments
[18]. Other motivations for their presence include the
payer’s ability to recoup the losses associated with excess
spending [23], and the more general insight from the
pay-for-performance literature that the marginal utility
from receiving additional income is diminishing [31]
(which is an efficiency argument).
Quality
As a means to further stimulate value-based provision of
health care, accountable care programs often make the
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net sharing rate dependent on the quality of care [20, 21,
23]. The sharing rate and shared savings payment limit,
together determine the amount of savings eligible for
sharing; the quality of the care provided determines the
amount of shared savings payments made.
The design of this element requires a choice on the di-
mensions of quality that will be monitored, the operatio-
nalization of the quality indicators, scoring, and how
these scores will be tied to shared savings payments.
The Pilot Program
Structure of the pilot and project members
The pilot includes a large Dutch health insurer and a na-
tional chain of primary care providers. The project is led
by a steering group, consisting of the general director of
the primary care providers and the health insurer’s pri-
mary care purchasing manager. The steering group
makes decisions on matters related to the project (by
consensus) and directs the activities of the project team.
The project team’s reports are used as an input for the
discussion. This team includes representatives from the
health insurer, the care providers involved and the aca-
demic research team (the authors). In carrying out its ac-
tivities, the project group’s members form and chair
subcommittees, comprised of employees from a wide var-
iety of departments (depending on the matter at hand, e.g.
quality, data management and communication).
The pilot providers
For evaluation purposes, the decision was made not to
include all of the chain’s providers, neither was a ran-
dom selection of providers deemed appropriate. First, a
provider’s population size must be large enough to en-
sure a satisfactory level of statistical reliability of the cost
and quality results [27]. Second, the provider must be
capable of assuming the accountability implied by the
pilot program. A provider was deemed capable when it
is able to (1) routinely collect data on the quality of care,
as needed for the calculation of the net sharing rate
(building block 5), (2) analyze these and other data such
that opportunities for improvement can be identified, (3)
create a forum where these opportunities are discussed
with its affiliated care providers, and where business
plans are made and implemented. Based on these re-
quirements, three providers were selected for the first
wave of the pilot. Table 1 provides relevant characteris-
tics of the three pilot providers.
Implementation
The pilot runs from July 2014 to July 2016. For each
building block, the research team mapped the full set of
decisions that could be made, as well as potential conse-
quences of each choice on statistical reliability and risk.
Each building block was discussed in detail with both
the health insurer and providers during joint meetings,
and their contents were adjusted until consensus was
reached. The research team made a number of site visits
to explain the model in detail and to present baseline
data on health care expenditures and quality. At each
site, providers were involved in the choice of invest-
ments in infrastructure. Performance with respect to
these interventions is a recurring theme during provider
meetings. Participating providers also report their results
to the steering group, who monitors performance on a
quarterly basis. First year results are expected for mid-
2016. In the next section, we describe the pilot’s shared
savings program. We structure the description of the
program by Fig. 1’s building blocks. Each building block
starts with the final design choice, followed by a discus-
sion and motivation.
The Shared Savings Program
Building block 1: Definition of the scope
Patient population
Patients are assigned to a pilot provider only and as long
as they (1) take up health insurance from the pilot in-
surer and (2) are registered with one of its primary care
physicians (PCPs). Thus, in case a patient withdraws
from the PCP list, the expenditures incurred for medical
care received after the withdrawal date no longer count
toward a provider’s expenditures under the shared sav-
ings program. Regarding (1), we use the health insurer’s
administrative database to identify its insured and use its
claims database to identify capitation payments, which
proxy for the PCP list (2)
Methods of assigning patients to providers have elic-
ited strong debate within US accountable care programs,
as concerns were raised about the extent to which pre-
vailing methods yield an accurate reflection of a pro-
vider’s patient population [25]. Absent a system of
patient registration, patients were assigned on the basis
of health care usage and debate has been on whether as-
signment should be prospective or retrospective. Under
prospective assignment, some patients may actually not
visit the provider during the performance year for rea-
sons unrelated to health (e.g. when they move out of the
area). Under retrospective assignment, not all patients
that visit the provider during the performance year may
be assigned in the end. Under both methods of patient
assignment a provider’s cost-saving intervention may not
be fully recouped, because the intervention may either
not reach the patient (as could happen under prospect-
ive assignment), or because some patients who receive
the intervention–and experience a drop in health care
expenditures accordingly–will not be assigned to the
provider in the end. In case these patients are assigned
to benchmark providers instead, the investing provider
may actually be harmed by its own investment.
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Table 1 Characteristics of the pilot PCHMs (December 2014)
Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider 3
Dimension
Total number of patients
(December 2014)
7178 7494 10568
Number of PCPs 5 3 4
PCP compensation Salary
Capitation fee,
fee-for-service,
bundled payment,
pay-for-performance
Capitation fee,
fee-for-service,
bundled payment,
pay-for-performance
Other care
professionals
involved
Nurse practitioner (somatic) (Advanced) nurse
practitioner (somatic)
Nurse practitioner (somatic)
Physician Assistant Pharmacist Pharmacist
Physiotherapist Physiotherapist Physiotherapist
Chronic care programs DM DM DM
COPD COPD COPD
CVRM, secondary CVRM, secondary CVRM, primary
and secondary
Osteoporosis Asthma
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In the Netherlands, all citizens are registered with
a PCP [32]. Patients are entitled to (a reimbursement
of ) non-acute non-incidental PCP care only when
they are registered with the providing PCP. It is
therefore straightforward to use PCP lists as the
basis for assignment, as it is not expected that pa-
tients who are registered with a PCP will receive
(non-acute non-incidental) PCP care from another
provider. Furthermore, Dutch citizens typically main-
tain a long relationship with their PCP, which makes
it easier to manage the population and allows for
reaping the long term benefits of improving patient
management. A national study [33] found that 60 %
has a treatment relationship of over 10 years. Only
9 % has a treatment relationship of less than 2 years.
People also tend to be loyal with their health in-
surer; annual switching rates are low (4-7 %) and
about 75 % have not switched insurer since the 2006
health insurance reforms [34]. Thus, a stable patient
population can be assumed. Out of the three op-
tions, using the GP list as the basis for defining ac-
countability, posed the least risk for participating
providers.
Services included
The scope of the program includes all medical ser-
vices for which the health insurer provides coverage
under both mandatory and supplementary health in-
surance packages–essentially its full line of business–
except dental care services. Patient expenditures
count towards provider expenditures up to an
amount of €22.500 ($25.376).
Including a large number of services into the
shared savings program is congruent with the pivotal
role Dutch PCPs play in the health care system.
Dental care was excluded from the scope of the pro-
gram because patients do not need a referral card to
visit a dentist. Neither did the pilot providers collab-
orated with dentists such that accountability could
be assumed. Including this type of care thus would
have introduced risk that could not have been ad-
equately managed.
The cut-off point of €22.500 protects providers
against high health care expenditures that can be as-
cribed to exceptional individual cases that are beyond
the influence of providers. This is desirable: the possi-
bility that random shocks in health and expenditures
cause true savings to go unrewarded dilutes incentive
strength [30]. The cut-off point was determined
jointly with the insurer and provider. In terms of its
place in the cumulative distribution of health care
costs, our threshold is close to the one used in other
programs [20].
Building block 2: Calculation of provider expenditures
Provider expenditures include both insurer and deduct-
ible payments, and are expressed as the person per-
annum expenditure average. We first annualize individ-
ual expenditures and implement the cut-off point, and
then calculate a weighted average over all assigned pa-
tients, using assignment length as weight [20]. Formally,
annualizing expenditures E of a patient i assigned to
provider p in pilot year t is done by:
AEipt
¼ min €22:500; 365
assignment lengthipt
 
 Eipt
 
ð1Þ
And the weighted per-annum expenditure average
over all assigned persons is given by:
Provider Expenditurespt ¼
X
i ∈Ipt
assignment lengthipt
365
 
 AEipt
 
X
i ∈Ipt
assignment lengthipt
ð2Þ
Expenditure savings within the domain of a patient’s
deductible do not accrue to the health insurer. We
nevertheless chose to include deductible payments in
the definition of provider expenditures, as a patient’s de-
ductible choice only seems partly related to health and
expectations regarding health care consumption [35]. In
that case, excluding deductible payments from the calcu-
lation of provider expenditures implies that otherwise
similar efforts in lowering expenditures would be evalu-
ated differently–depending on the average deductible
level across patient populations, which depends on fac-
tors unobserved to the research team. Similar to the
choice for a cut-off point, leaving out deductible pay-
ments would have introduced additional risk that could
not have been managed by the care providers.
Building block 3: Construction of the benchmark
Benchmark population and trending factor
A provider’s expenditure savings are evaluated against a
benchmark. The benchmark consists of two parts. The
first part is the provider’s historical pre-pilot three-year
weighted average of provider expenditures WPAp, with
larger weights attached to more recent years (0.1; 0.3;
0.6 respectively) [20]. We refer to this part as the ‘base’
of the benchmark, and we denote the three base years
by ‘base year (BY) 1,2 and 3’ with base year 3 being the
most recent year. This is the year prior to the start of
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the pilot (baseline; 0″ in subscripts). The second part
of the benchmark is the growth in provider expenditures
from baseline to the performance year of interest 1 + gct,
for a control group of randomly sampled non-
participating providers (N = 50) in the region surround-
ing the pilot area.
Formally, the benchmark for a pilot provider p in pilot
year y = t is denoted by:
Benchmarkpt ¼ WPAp  1þ gc;t
  ð3Þ
In which
gðc;tÞ ¼ Π tðy¼1Þð1þ gcyÞ;withg ;cy
¼ Provider expenditures ðc; yÞ−provider expenditures ðc; y−1Þ
provider expenditures ðc; y−1Þ
ð4Þ
In the implementation section we describe how the
parameters of the benchmark are obtained.
The historical expenditures that together form the
base of the benchmark create a ‘starting position’ that
should lie within reach for pilot providers. Additional in-
centives for cost containment for inefficient providers
follow from making the growth rate context-
independent. Research on goal setting theory suggests
that performance increases in goal difficulty, up to the
point where the difficulty of the goal lies outside one’s
ability [36]. Following this research, it is expected that a
combination of both approaches yields better perform-
ance (especially for low performers) than when the
benchmark is shaped according to one approach only:
outperforming the counterfactual might prove too easy,
whereas a benchmark that does not take into account
the particularities of the respective provider (e.g. its
population), may not be within the provider’s reach.
Risk adjustment
The expenditures of base year 1 and 2 are expressed in
terms of base year 3′s case mix. By doing so, both num-
bers will reflect what historical expenditures would have
been had the patient population been similar to the
population at baseline. On top of that, these numbers
are trended forward to baseline euros (€) to account for
inflation and other periodic effects (e.g. changes in regu-
lation like an expansion of the universal mandatory
health insurance package). Similarly, the growth trend is
adjusted for case mix differences between control pro-
viders and the pilot provider, such that they reflect what
the growth in health care expenditures would have been,
had the control group witnessed a change in case mix
similar to that observed in the pilot provider.
We adjust the benchmark for case mix differences in
demographics, socioeconomic status and health, and
periodic effects (further explained in the implementation
section below), as they have explained variation in health
care expenditures between providers before [37]. We ad-
just for differences in demographics and socioeconomic
status on a concurrent base, and prospectively adjust for
differences in health [20]. Adjusting on a prospective
base means that we set its value equal to its level upon
assignment and hold it fixed for the assignment period.
In an additional file we provide an overview of all vari-
ables and how they are adjusted for (see Additional file
2).
Concurrently adjusting for health status implies that
care providers could inflate their benchmarks by upcod-
ing diagnoses [20]. Furthermore, concurrent adjustment
for health status lowers the incentive to prevent illness,
in particular those conditions that are well-
compensated. As a means to enhance incentives for pre-
vention and cure, we therefore adjusted for health status
on a prospective base and use concurrent risk-
adjustment for all other variables.
Building block 4: Assessment of savings
Approach to constructing the savings threshold
The level of provider savings is determined by evaluating
provider expenditures against the benchmark. We use
statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether any
observed difference in provider and benchmark expendi-
tures is large enough to rule out randomness with statis-
tical confidence. The relevant hypothesis test is a one-
sided t-test for ‘no savings or losses’ (the null hypothesis)
versus ‘savings’ (the alternative hypothesis) [27]. Under
the statistical test, we need to determine a threshold
value (the alpha) above which we reject the null hypoth-
esis of no savings. This threshold has important implica-
tions for the pilot providers as it determines whether
‘savings’ are labeled as such; a stricter threshold value
protects the payer from making undeserved shared sav-
ings payments, but it also increases the type-II error of
not rewarding true savings–the prospect of which dilutes
incentives [30]. Thus, rather than using threshold values
from other accountable care programs (commonly
expressed as a percentage of benchmark expenditures)
or sticking to “conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance”, Pope and Kautter [27] advocate a more prag-
matic analysis of setting the threshold, based on Power
Analysis. We follow this approach and determine the
exact values upon receiving the baseline data.
Building block 5: Rules and conditions for sharing savings
Sharing rate and shared savings payment limit
The health insurer and pilot providers agreed on a shar-
ing rate and a shared savings payment limit, which are
not reported here for reasons of confidentiality. The pay-
ment limit is based on a percentage of provider revenue.
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Quality
For the first wave of the pilot, quality is assessed on four
domains: patient satisfaction, chronic care, drug pre-
scription behavior and practice management. These do-
mains were determined jointly with the pilot insurer and
providers, based on beliefs of providers’ current span of
accountability, data availability and reliability. The
resulting domains predominantly reflect health care ser-
vices that are delivered or coordinated by the pilot pro-
viders themselves. Nevertheless, these domains may be
changed in later waves to include more specialist ser-
vices, should pilot providers start engaging in formal
contractual arrangements with specialist providers.
Within each domain, quality indicators are formulated
and scored on a 0-100 % scale such that a 0 % score and
a 100 % score reflect ‘worst’ and ‘best’ possible perform-
ance respectively. Performance on these scales is mea-
sured in absolute terms. Performance scales are
subdivided into gates [21], and in passing a gate a pro-
vider receives 3 performance points for absolute per-
formance. Figure 2 visualizes this pay-for-performance
element. In an additional file we provide an overview of
all quality indicators (see Additional file 3).
On top of earning performance points, providers can
also earn points for improving their performance relative
to last year. This has a similar system (Fig. 3):
Providers earn 1 point for passing a gate (implying a
1:3 ratio for improvement and absolute performance
[38]). In case a provider’s performance has declined
more than 5 % over the performance year, it receives no
points for performance improvement, and loses all its
points earned for absolute performance. This should
serve as a penalty for providers who try to lower expen-
ditures by lowering quality. As scores change from year
to year depending on population characteristics, we
chose not to impose this penalty for declines smaller
than 5 % already. Ultimately, the percentage of savings
shared depends on the provider’s overall quality score.
The overall quality score is obtained by first summing
performance and improvement points over all indicators,
by domain, and dividing it over the maximum score (16
per indicator) to obtain a domain average. Second, these
domain averages are summed and averaged to obtain an
overall quality score. In case a provider scores 60 %, it
will receive 60 % of the sharing rate of savings, which, in
case of a 50 % sharing rate, is 30 % of overall savings.
Eijkenaar [31] provides an overview of the contribu-
tions done in the area of the design of quality payment
programs. The incentives following from the “quality
payment program” in the shared savings program (i.e.
the savings a provider receives are related to the quality
of the care provided), are targeted at the group (pro-
vider) level rather than at the level of the individual
physician. According to Eijkenaar [31], this is preferred
in case improvement needs collective action, which we
believe holds in our setting where a multitude of disci-
plines cooperates in the treatment of a wide range of pa-
tients, and where quality is measured on dimensions
related to, among others, chronic care and patient satis-
faction. Moreover, pilot providers indicated that they
refer to colleagues when these are known to have par-
ticular expertise in the field (e.g. dermatology).
The performance goals are absolute rather than rela-
tive, to foster collaboration and sharing best practices
with one another [21]–the pilot providers operate in
each other’s vicinity. We define multiple targets (i.e.
gates) and reward for both absolute performance and
improvement such that, in principle, low performers are
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%90%
Gate 1 Gate 2 Gate 3 Gate 4
0 points 3 points 6 points 9 points 12
Provider has a score 
of 40%. It passes 
gate 1 only and 
receives only 3 points 
accordingly
Provider has a score of 
89%. It passes three 
gates and receives 3 x 3 
= 9 points accordingly
Fig. 2 Earning points for absolute performance. The black and white checkered bar represents the score obtained on a specific indicator, ranging
from 0 % to 100 % of the maximum achievable score. The bar is subdivided into five gates. For each gate passed, a provider receives
three points
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also incentivized [31]. In later waves of the pilot, the
level of the lower and upper targets may be adjusted up
or downwards depending on the state of affairs, similar
to what was done in the Alternative Quality Contract
(data to do so already were not available on a national
scale when the program was designed).
Methods
Obtaining the benchmark’s parameters
We start with describing our approach to obtaining the
growth rate gct first. To obtain this rate, we estimate a
model of the log of provider expenditures (see expres-
sion 2). In our model we include case mix variables, year
dummies and an interaction between the year dummies
and the control providers p = c. The case mix variables
are operationalized as proportions, expressed in assign-
ment days (e.g. “the sum of assignment length over all
women in provider p’s population, divided over the sum
of assignment days). That is, even though a provider
may have an equal number of men and women assigned
to it, the average assignment length ultimately deter-
mines the reported proportion. Formally, the model is
described by:
Ln Provider Expenditurespt
 
¼ μþ Ξ 0ptΒþ D
0
year tð ÞΓ þ Dyear tð Þ  Cp
 	
D
þ αp þ pt ð5Þ
In which Ξpt is an m × 1 column vector of m demo-
graphic, health (care) and socioeconomic variables (Add-
itional file 2), Dyear are year dummies and Cp is an
indicator variable for whether a provider belongs to the
set of 50 providers that together form the control group
of randomly sampled non-participating providers (N =
50). B, Γ and D denote the accompanying parameter
vectors. Their elements are denoted by small-case char-
acters βm, γt and δt respectively. αp ~ IID(0, σa
2) and
pt ~ IID(0, σ
2 ) together form the model’s error term,
with αp representing the provider specific component
and ∈pt representing the remainder component.
Due to the log-transformation of provider expendi-
tures, the parameters can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities (i.e. they inform about the percentage change
in provider expenditures in response to a change in B, Γ
or D). This is a convenient property for calculating the
rate of growth in expenditures of the control group over
two consecutive years t − 1 and t, as it equals the sum of
(γt − γt-1) and (δt − δt-1) under a constant case mix. To
predict what this rate of growth had been had the con-
trol group witnessed a change in case mix similar to that
observed in the pilot provider p, we must impute pilot
provider p’s values for Ξt and Ξt-1. Formally:
~g c;yð Þ ¼ ln Provider Expendituresctð Þ− ln Provider Expendituresct−1ð Þ
¼ Ξ′pt−Ξ′pt−1
 
Bþ γt−γt−1
 þ δt−δt−1ð Þ
ð6Þ
(Note that ~g c;yð Þ is formally modeled as the rate of
growth of the pilot provider p plus any additional
growth in the control group.)
The base of the benchmark is a weighted average of
three years of pre-pilot spending. The most recent year
can be considered the baseline year. A first step in arriv-
ing at this weighted average is to first calculate provider
expenditures as under (2), for each base year. A second
step is now to express base years’ 1 and 2 expenditures
in terms of the case mix at baseline [39]. Due to the log-
transformation of provider expenditures, the parameter
estimates in B and Γ, can be used to estimate the per-
centage change in provider expenditures as a response
to either changes in case mix and periodic effects per-
taining to the provider (inflation). For example, the par-
ameter estimate βwomen informs about the percentage
change in average provider expenditures in response to a
change in the proportion of women. By subtracting the
proportion of women in provider p in base year 1 from
that of base year 3, and subsequently multiplying this
number by βwomen, one can estimate the change in pro-
vider expenditures for base year 1, had the provider wit-
nessed a similar proportion of women back then. When
we do this for all elements in B and Γ (for the particular
years) we arrive at the total percentage change in pro-
vider expenditures. A third step is to then multiply base
Gate4 
-5%
-5%
0%
0%
+2,5% +5% +7,5%
Gate1 Gate2 Gate3 
1 point 2 points 3 points 4 points
Loses all 
points
Fig. 3 Earning points for improving year-to-year performance. Earning points for improving year-to-year performance. The black and white check-
ered bar represents the score obtained for improvement on a specific indicator, ranging from–5 % to +7.5 % (and up). The bar is subdivided into
four gates. For each gate passed, a provider receives one point
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years’ 1 and 2 expenditures by the summation of 1 plus
this percentage change (e.g. this totals 1,05 for an esti-
mated change in expenditures of 5 %). The final steps
are to multiply the resulting number by the weights
assigned to each year (0,1 for base year 1; 0,3 for base
year 2 and 0,6 for base year 3) [20] and to sum over each
base line year to determine WPAp.
Structural support
Accountable care programs aim to incentivize pro-
viders to alter their behavior, in particular those be-
haviors associated with managing a patient
population. Realizing savings may thus require chan-
ging complex and entrenched behaviors. Furthermore,
the shared savings payments to pilot providers are de-
termined over a full year of care provision and over a
care continuum which extends well beyond the pro-
viders’ own setting.
Systematic reviews of the effectiveness of pay-for-
performance programs suggest that these programs are
most effective at changing “simple, discrete and time-
limited ” behaviors [40], which, by their nature, may not
be the behaviors that lead to significant or enduring sav-
ings by the end of the performance year. When targeted
at complex and entrenched behaviors, pay-for-
performance programs seem most effective when ac-
companied by supportive strategies [40]. During the
pilot, providers receive support in a number of respects.
For example, it was recognized that providers have in-
complete data on their patients’ health care use and
costs. This holds in particular for care delivered within
other segments (such as specialist care). The pilot pro-
viders indicated that this prevented them from obtaining
an adequate picture of their population’s health care
consumption, which was deemed an essential input for
redesigning population management. Complementing
these data with appropriate benchmarks gave hints for
improvement.
The pilot providers were asked to indicate their
data needs. Generally, these data were available at the
health insurer (e.g. most expensive specialisms, hos-
pital treatments, laboratory tests at the population
level, health care usage of the most expensive pa-
tients). Benchmark data on hospital care (e.g. number
of treatments per specialism and types of treatment
per specialism (inpatient, outpatient, same day admis-
sion/discharge)) were obtained from the Dutch Na-
tional Atlas of Public Health [41]. Other benchmark
data will be provided upon receiving data of the
population of patient assigned to providers in the
control group. The data analysts of the insurer, the
pilot providers and the academic team were involved
to ensure correct interpretation of the information.
This process will repeated throughout the pilot,
should data needs change.
Discussion
Pilot aims
The overall aim of implementing the shared savings pro-
gram is to lower spending growth without compromis-
ing on the quality of care. The approach is to reorient
providers towards value-based care, or to otherwise sup-
port such an orientation by adapting the payment sys-
tem along this line. The accountable care program and
supportive strategies aid may strengthen primary care
providers in redesigning the structures and processes of
health care delivery. Extensive data sharing allows pro-
viders to identify the inefficiencies built up in the con-
tinuum of care; the prospect of shared savings payments
incentivizes providers to address these inefficiencies. As
shared savings payments are determined with respect to
the care continuum, pilot providers are furthermore mo-
tivated to change their configuration to one that sup-
ports substitution of specialist care, coordination across
silos, prevention and self-management.
Pilot opportunities
The pilot system provides a number of opportunities for
achieving the pilot aims that are typically not found in
other initiatives. First, Dutch citizens enroll with a PCP
and their enrollment is typically long-lasting, which fa-
cilitates the design of interventions targeted at achieving
the pilot aims, and rewards adopting a long-term
perspective.
Second and related, since the method of assigning pa-
tients to pilot providers is not based on actual health
care usage but on enrollment instead, less patients will
be “lost to follow-up” [42], because also the scores on
quality indicators for patients that do not (regularly) visit
the provider count towards the provider’s average. In
contrast, patients that do not visit the provider except in
case of emergency will not be assigned to the provider
under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, because
emergency care is not part of the definition of ‘primary
care services’ upon which assignment is based [42]. In-
cluding these (generally vulnerable) patients in the pro-
gram incentives providers to also reach out for them,
involve them in tailor-made care programs, and to im-
prove care accordingly [42]. However, an assignment
system based on registration could provide incentives
for risk selection: providers could deny access to high
risk patients, or may take actions that lead to an outflow
of high risk patients to neighboring providers. This will
be a topic of further study.
A third opportunity is that the shared savings pay-
ments are at the provider level (and not on the level of
the individual PCP), which encourages collaboration
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within pilot centers and recognizes that potential suc-
cessful interventions are group efforts. A US study on
accountability relationships within participating pro-
viders found that rewards were at the level of the indi-
vidual provider despite recognizing that program aims
would be more readily achieved by group effort (i.e. col-
laboration between individual providers) [43]. Similarly,
quality is scored in absolute terms rather than in relative
terms, to encourage collaboration between providers.
A fourth opportunity arises from the small scale of the
pilot. Due to this small scale, it is not computationally
burdensome to calculate savings thresholds for each
pilot provider separately. In larger initiatives, predeter-
mined thresholds tend to be used8. Hypothesis testing
provides a more accurate way of addressing the random
variation in health care expenditures and the odds of
outperforming the benchmark by chance.
Pilot challenges
The pilot system faces a number of challenges in achiev-
ing its aims. One challenge comes from the fragmented
structure of the Dutch health care system. Whereas in
the US a substantial number of accountable care pro-
viders include a hospital [26], the functions of primary
and secondary care remain rather separate in the
Netherlands. It is unsure whether pilot providers, in
their attempts to lower health care expenditures, suc-
ceed in involving specialist providers–in particular be-
cause specialist payment models have a volume
component. Earlier experiments in accountable care pro-
grams targeted at primary care providers, resulted in an
increase in expenditures of secondary care. Although it
is yet unclear why such a trend occurred, one hypothesis
is that specialist providers make up for a drop in the pa-
tient volumes (−25 % compared to care-as-usual under
the experiment), by increasing treatment intensity (+
€142) [44].
A second challenge is that specialist care is billed
retrospectively. Specialist care is classified into packages
called ‘diagnosis-treatment combinations (DTC)’, which
have a duration of 1 year. Only upon billing the DTC,
health insurers know that a particular individual received
specialist care. For those DTCs with a starting date of
late 2014, the billing date is expected to be mid-2016.
The late billing time for specialist care implies that
shared savings payments can be determined 1 to 1,5 years
after the end of the performance year. A first implication
is that the incentives will be less strong for this delayed
lump-sum as people tend to discount future payments
[45]. It furthermore adds uncertainty [30]. As of 2015,
the duration of DTCs will be drastically shortened to
120 days however, which speeds up this process. This
also allows the health insurer to provide interim insight
on specialist care use for pilot providers. The pilot
providers standardized the process of registering patient
referrals so that information on secondary care use will
become available earlier.
Experience with GP fundholding
Several national health care systems have gained ex-
perience with holding care providers accountable for
the costs and quality of health care. An interesting
case in this respect is the English National Health
Service, because its programs were targeted at GPs as
well. Furthermore, NHS GPs are considered gate-
keepers too and have worked separately from hospi-
tals. Several programs and reforms have been
implemented over the years, among which are the
Quality and Outcomes Framework [46], Clinical
Commissioning Groups [47] and GP Fundholding
[48]. The latter bears most resemblance to the Shared
Savings Program. Under GP Fundholding (1991–
1997), GPs received a budget to commission health
services on behalf of their population, and were enti-
tled to the savings against this budget. Although there
are only a few empirical studies of good quality on
this topic [49], research suggests that the abolition of
this fundholding scheme led to an increase in admis-
sion rates for chargeable elective admissions of be-
tween 3,5 – 5,1 % [50]. Research also documents a
lower growth rate in prescribing costs in fundholding
practices [51]. The evaluation of the Shared Savings
Program will ultimately show whether pilot GPs are
able to exert similar influence over the value of care
delivered across the continuum. However, there are a
number of fundamental differences between both pro-
grams that could change the Shared Savings Pro-
gram’s relative performance. First and foremost, the
pilot GPs are not tasked with commissioning health
services of behalf of their patients, which is still done
by the health insurer. Thus, pilot GPs may have a
somewhat less direct influence on where patients will
go for treatment. Second, the Shared Savings Pro-
gram’s benchmark against which savings are calcu-
lated is determined ex post, rather than ex ante.
Although this could yield a more precise estimate of
true savings, this does increase uncertainty over the
size of the shared savings payments which lowers the
strength of the savings incentive. Third, the bench-
mark in the Shared Savings Program is more ad-
vanced in terms of case mix correction (under GP
Fundholding, the budget was determined based on
historical expenditures). This, in turn, makes it easier
to identify and reward true savings efforts, which
lowers uncertainty. Fourth, in the Shared Savings Pro-
gram, a link is established between the level of shared
savings payments and the quality of care, which could
lower the incentive to skimp on quality or to stint on
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care to save costs. In contrast, under GP Fundhold-
ing, research documented a drop in patient satisfac-
tion [52], which is explicitly monitored and rewarded
here. Whether these differences in design (or institu-
tional environment) drive any difference in the rela-
tive performance of both models is a topic of further
study.
Research plan
The impact of the Shared Savings Program will be evalu-
ated on three dimensions: quality, accessibility and expen-
ditures. Since we did not have an opportunity to collect
similar quality data for the control group, changes in qual-
ity will be assessed using before-after studies (including
the indicators that cover accessibility). In terms of expen-
ditures, we are able to use difference-in-difference designs
commonly used to evaluate Shared Savings Models [53,
54]. Propensity scores can be used to account for
selection-into-treatment [55]. Apart from this general
evaluation, we will evaluate several design choices in terms
of their statistical properties. These include the choice for
a cut-off point in health care expenditures, the threshold
value in the savings test, and the performance of the risk-
adjustment model. As for the latter, since the method of
assigning patients to pilot providers is based on active
registration, we will simulate the Program’s results under
different scenarios of risk selection to check whether this
would be a viable strategy for participating providers.
Conclusion
Shared savings programs are a relatively new
phenomenon and it remains to be studied whether
prevailing designs are optimal. This papers demon-
strates that a common theme appears to be the
minimization of risk and uncertainty, in the presence
of which providers will be discouraged to invest in a
whole-system perspective. Health system characteris-
tics play an important role here. Dutch PCPs assist
patients in navigating the health care system. This al-
lows for a broader scope of the shared savings pro-
gram, in the sense that few parts of the care
continuum are a black box to the accountable pro-
vider. However, due to institutional fragmentation
within the Dutch health care system, Dutch providers
are typically small in scale and scope, which could
pose challenges to the viability of the shared savings
programs. Savings might be offset by providers not
incentivized by the contract and, under prevailing
(statistical) minimum savings thresholds, the efforts
required to gain from participating in the program
may be large. These will be important topics for
evaluation.
Irrespective of these challenges, incorporating a shared
savings program does reward taking accountability for
overall costs and quality results, and could thereby improve
the sustainability of the primary care setting. Furthermore,
since patients typically have a long-lasting relationship with
their personal physician, accountability can more readily be
assumed and monitored properly; if one is able to condition
on a relatively stable population, the confidence with which
changes in costs and quality can be related to changes in
population management (rather than to changes in the
composition of the patient population), improves. Thus,
shared savings programs fit particularly well into the con-
cept of enhanced primary care. Testing this principle for a
non-US health care system–like under the current pilot–in-
creases our understanding of shared savings programs, in
particular of the mechanisms through which incentivized
providers can control spending growth and improve
quality.
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